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People v. Simac: How Much is too Much
Advocacy?
I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Simac,' the Illinois Supreme Court drew a line between
an attorney's interest in zealously representing a client, and a trial
court's concern in maintaining control of the courtroom. Illinois
courts, as well as the American Bar Association's ("ABA's") Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, require an attorney to represent
zealously a client within the bounds of the law.2 Courts, on the other
hand, have long used the contempt power to preserve proper order in a
courtroom. 3 These two interests collided in Simac when criminal defense attorney David Sotomayor substituted his law clerk for the
defendant at the defense trial table without the trial court's permission
or knowledge.4 Sotomayor's tactic succeeded, because the trial court
dropped the charges against defendant Simac after two subsequent
misidentifications; however, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's finding that defense attorney Sotomayor was guilty of direct
criminal contempt.5
This Note first examines the interaction between attorney advocacy
and court discipline, 6 specifically, the court's use of the contempt
power 7 and the attorney's professional responsibility.' Next, this
Note discusses the historical use and legitimacy of in-court identifications, first focusing on attorney tactics to combat the suggestiveness of
such identifications, 9 then focusing on the court's treatment of such
tactics.'0 This Note then examines the facts and opinions of Simac."
1. 641 N.E.2d 416 (Ill. 1994) [hereinafter Simac 11].
2. People v. Dread, 327 N.E.2d 175, 179 (Ill. App. 3d Dist. 1975); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1981); see also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS § 10.3.1, at 579 (1986) (explaining that the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct state the same principle in its comment to Model Rule 1.3).
3. See Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 307-09 (1888); People v. Siegel, 445 N.E.2d
762, 763 (Ill. 1983); People v. Loughran, 118 N.E.2d 310, 311 (111. 1954); WOLFRAM,
supra note 2, § 12.1.3, at 625.
4. Simac 11, 641 N.E.2d at 417. The trial took place in DuPage County. Id.
5. Id. at 424.
6. See infra part II.A.
7. See infra part II.A. 1.
8. See infra part II.A.2.
9. See infra part II.B.
10. See infra part II.C.
11. See infra part III.
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Next, it analyzes the Simac decision critically, pointing out several
weaknesses in the court's opinion.1 2 This Note then predicts how the
Simac decision will impact future attorney behavior in Illinois and
other jurisdictions grappling with similar issues. 3 Finally, this Note
concludes that the Simac court correctly upheld the judgment against
Sotomayor for direct criminal contempt, despite the opinion's shortcomings. 4

II.BACKGROUND
A. Attorney Advocacy and Court Discipline
The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility charges an
attorney with the duty "to represent his client zealously within the
bounds of the law."' 5 The very language of the rule, therefore, creates
a tension between the attorney's duty to his or her client, and the attorney's duty to stay within the parameters of the law.' 6 Because an
attorney must represent his or her client zealously for the adversarial
legal system to function properly,"' an attorney will encounter confrontations with a trial judge when the judge believes that the attorney
has crossed the bounds of the law.' 8 Consequently, an attorney must
strike a proper balance between client advocacy and judicial respect. 9
Illinois courts have grappled with the issue of how much advocacy
is too much. 20 Courts draw the line when an attorney seeks "to secure
from a court an order or judgment without a full and frank disclosure
of all matters and facts which the court ought to know.",2' An attorney
who crosses this line is subject to both judicial and professional

12. See infra part IV.
13. See infra part V.
14. See infra part VI.
15. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1981); see also
WOLFRAM, supra note 2, § 10.3.1, at 579 (explaining that the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct set forth the same principle in its comment to Model Rule 1.3).
16. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
17. See WOLFRAM, supra note 2, § 10.3.2, at 581-82.
18. Id.§ 11.3.1, at 600.
19. Id.
20. See People ex rel. Kunce v. Hogan, 364 N.E.2d 50, 52 (I11.1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1023 (1978); People ex rel. Fahey v. Burr, 147 N.E. 47, 52 (I11.), cert.
dismissed, 147 N.E. 53 (Ill. 1925). See generally Louis S. Raveson, Advocacy and
Contempt-Part Two: Charting the Boundaries of Contempt: Ensuring Adequate
Breathing Room for Advocacy, 65 WASH. L. REV. 743 (1990) (discussing and analyzing
the competing interests between permissible advocacy and contempt of court).
21. Burr, 147 N.E. at 52.
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control. A judge may regulate the attorney through evidentiary and
procedural rulings, or may punish the attorney through the power of
contempt. 23 Additionally, the legal profession may control the attorney
through professional discipline.24
1. Contempt Law
Judicial use of the contempt power can be traced to at least the
seventeenth century.2' Generally speaking, a court's contempt power
can be subdivided into two categories: civil contempt and criminal
contempt. 26 Courts utilize civil contempt powers to enforce the rights
of private litigants and to force compliance with orders or decrees for
the good of other litigants. 27 In contrast, courts exercise criminal contempt powers to punish and to preserve the dignity and authority of the
court.2 8

Although some jurisdictions have enacted legislation specifically
making contempt of court a crime,29 others have labeled contempt of
court a crime through judicial decision.3 ° Still other jurisdictions,
including Illinois, have declined to label contempt a specific "crime,"
22. See WOLFRAM, supra note 2, § 12.1.1, at 620.
23. Id. Wolfram advises that a court may, among other options, give a curative
instruction or may reverse a verdict. Id. Judicial control through these types of methods
limits a trial court's ability to handle an erring attorney. Id. Courts do not often use the
contempt power in cases of overzealous advocacy because of its potential for
arbitrariness and its status as a "blunderbuss" of last resort. Id. Evidentiary and
procedural regulation is beyond the scope of this Note.
24. Id. (stating that professional discipline often is not imposed because judges and
adversaries are reluctant to report violations).
25.

WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.7, at 43 & n.54 (2d ed.

1986) (citing Anonymous, 73 Eng. Rep. 416 (1631)). One of the first recorded cases of
criminal contempt concerned a criminal defendant who threw a brickbat at the judge. Id.
After the court held the defendant in contempt, the defendant's right hand was cut off and
he was executed in the presence of the court. Id.
26. See Estate of Hader, 449 N.E.2d 540, 546 (11. App. 1st Dist. 1983) (citing 47th
& State Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Coleman Corp., 371 N.E.2d 294, 297-98 (11. App.
1st Dist. 1978)). See generally Robert J. Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating
the Confusion Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 677 (1981)
(discussing the need for jurisdictions to adopt a contempt statute to eliminate the
confusion between civil and criminal contempt).
27. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Barasch, 173 N.E.2d 417, 418 (Ill. 1961)
(citing People v. McDonald, 145 N.E. 636, 637 (I1. 1924)). For an example of a civil
contempt case, see Hader, 449 N.E.2d at 546-47 (reversing a trial court's finding of civil
contempt against a bank failing to comply with a discovery order).
28. People v. L.A.S., 490 N.E.2d 1271, 1273 (Ill. 1986) (citing People v. Javaras,
281 N.E.2d 670, 673 (I11.1972)); People v. Siegel, 445 N.E.2d 762, 764 (11l. 1983).
29. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1988); LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 25, § 1.7(e), at
46 & n.86.
30. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 25, § 1.7(e), at 46 n.84.
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but nevertheless have labeled certain conduct as "criminal contempt"
and have imposed penal sanctions for criminal contempt through the
exercise of judicial power." Regardless of the basis for the criminal
contempt power, most courts utilize this power only when all other
methods of judicial control have failed.32
The Illinois Supreme Court divides the law of contempt into direct
contempt and indirect contempt.33 Direct contempt is contemptuous
conduct which occurs in the presence of a judge. 34 Because the judge
observes the contemptuous conduct, all of the elements of the offense
are within the judge's personal knowledge.35 Although the United
States Supreme Court has held that a judge may proceed directly to the
punishment phase without violating the Due Process Clause,36 the
Illinois Supreme Court has qualified this holding, reasoning that the
lack of procedural guarantees requires that the direct contempt power
"be exercised with utmost caution and strictly restricted to acts and
facts seen and known by the court ....
31. See, e.g., Barasch, 173 N.E.2d at 418-19 (explaining that while the Illinois
Supreme Court has "repeatedly held that contempt is not a crime ... the proceeding is
[nevertheless] in the nature of criminal contempt."); see also People v. Brown, 601
N.E.2d 1380, 1383 (Ill. App. 4th Dist. 1992) (explaining "that the inherent authority of
the Illinois judiciary to punish contemnors derives from article VI of the Constitution of
1970, which establishes the Illinois judiciary.").
32. See WOLFRAM, supra note 2, § 12.1.3, at 626. Wolfram also notes that out of all
attorneys, criminal defense attorneys are most often cited for contempt. Id. In addition,
Wolfram discusses the ramifications of the contempt finding on an attorney. Id.
33. People v. Jashunsky, 282 N.E.2d 1, 3 (I1l.) (citing People v. Howarth, 114
N.E.2d 785, 790 (Ill. 1953)), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972).
34. Loughran, 118 N.E.2d at 313 (citing Terry, 128 U.S. at 308-09). But see
Jashunsky, 282 N.E.2d at 3 (explaining that direct criminal contempt also "includes acts
committed in an integral part of the court although out of the physical presence of the
judge.").
For an example of direct criminal contempt, see People v. Carr, 278 N.E.2d 839 (111.
App. 1st Dist. 1971) (upholding a direct criminal contempt finding as appropriate where
a criminal defendant punched a State's Attorney in open court). See generally Ronald J.
Rychlak, Direct Criminal Contempt and the Trial Attorney: Constitutional Limitations
on the Contempt Power, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 243 (1990) (discussing direct criminal
contempt and proposing guidelines to provide practitioners with general information
about contempt).
35. Jashunsky, 282 N.E.2d at 4 (citing People ex rel. Owens v. Hogan, 100 N.E. 177
(11. 1912)).
36. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 535 (1925) (citing Terry, 128 U.S. at
309). Thus, no need exists for an indictment or information, a plea, a trial, advice of
counsel for the contemnor, or any other regular procedural guarantee. Id. Such an action
by the judge does not violate the Due Process Clause because the judge directly observed
the behavior that prompted the contempt finding. Id.
37. Loughran, 118 N.E.2d at 313. In fact, the court instructed that "no matter resting
upon opinions, conclusions, presumptions or inferences should be considered." Id. The
court further explained that the lack of procedural guarantees mandates these constraints.
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Indirect contempt, on the other hand, is defined as "contemptuous
conduct 'which in whole or in an essential part occurred out of the presence of the court ....",8 Because a judge has not witnessed the
contemptuous conduct at issue, due process concerns are greater than
in cases of direct contempt.39 The court need not, however, conduct a
full jury trial.' Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court allows a trial judge
to find an attorney guilty of indirect contempt after giving the attorney
notice, giving the attorney an opportunity to answer, and holding a
hearing concerning the matter.4'
Proof of criminal contempt requires a showing that the particular
"conduct was calculated to embarrass, hinder or obstruct a court in its
administration of justice, to derogate from its authority or dignity or
bring the administration of law into disrepute. 4 Although the elements of contempt require an intent and an act,43 intent may be inferred
from the individual's actions. 44 The requisite intent, therefore, is a
voluntary act by an individual who knows or reasonably should know
that his or her conduct is wrongful. 45 Thus, Illinois courts do not
require that an individual intentionally act contemptuous in order for
the actor to be held in contempt of court.4

Id.
38. L.A.S., 490 N.E.2d at 1273 (quoting People v. Harrison, 86 N.E.2d 208, 212 (I11.
1949)). For an example of indirect contempt, see People v. Winchell, 359 N.E.2d 487
(Ill. App. 3d Dist. 1977) (upholding an indirect criminal contempt finding against a
criminal defendant who failed to appear for a court appearance).
39. See Cooke, 267 U.S. at 537; L.A.S., 490 N.E.2d at 1273 (citing People v.
Javaras, 281 N.E.2d 670, 674 (Il. 1972)).
40. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 692-700 (1964) (rejecting the argument
that those charged with criminal contempt have a constitutional right to a jury trial and
allowing courts to proceed without delay in contempt cases). Nevertheless, the Court
has subsequently held that a jury trial is required for criminal contempt convictions
which result in more than six months imprisonment. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194,
210-11 (1968); see LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 25, § 1.7, at 47-48.
41. L.A.S., 490 N.E.2d at 1273 (citing Javaras,281 N.E.2d at 671).
42. Siegel, 445 N.E.2d at 764.
43. People v. Bertelle, 518 N.E.2d 332, 334 (Ill.
App. 1st Dist. 1987).
44. See, e.g., Siegel, 445 N.E.2d at 764; People ex rel. Kunce v. Hogan, 364 N.E.2d
50, 52 (I1. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1023 (1978).
45. Bertelle, 518 N.E.2d at 334 (defining the requisite action and intent necessary for
a direct contempt finding as "a voluntary act by one who knows or who should
reasonably be aware that his conduct is wrongful."); see People v. Ernest, 566 N.E.2d
231, 236 (Ill. 1990) (citing L.A.S., 490 N.E.2d at 1273-74), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 808
(1991).
46. Hogan, 364 N.E.2d at 52.
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Three Illinois Supreme Court cases illustrate the requisite intent for a
contempt conviction. First, in People ex rel. Kunce v. Hogan,47 the
court upheld a criminal contempt conviction against defense attorney
Dennis Hogan.48 Hogan, while representing a client in a criminal
case, filed a civil suit against the presiding judge after the client was
found guilty, but before the client's sentencing. 49 Hogan insisted that
he filed the suit based on his good faith belief that he would have lost
standing to contest the bail practices in the county had he not filed his
suit before sentencing. 50 Hogan argued that the State had to prove that
he had intended to obstruct or impede the court, or to embarrass it in
the administration of justice. 5' The court disagreed, and held that
intent may be inferred from proof of the surrounding circumstances
and from the character of the action of the defendant. 52 The court
found that even if Hogan correctly filed the suit, Hogan could have
avoided including the judge as a defendant.53 Thus, the filing of the
suit "lends itself to the reasonable inference that the suit was calculated
to affect the outcome of the case or to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct
the court or derogate from the court's authority or dignity or to bring
the administration of law into disrepute."'
Next, in People ex rel. Fahey v. Burr,5" the Illinois Supreme Court
upheld a finding of contempt against two attorneys who failed to disclose certain information to the trial court in a writ for habeas corpus.56
The trial court discovered the information that the attorneys failed to
disclose after granting the writ.57 The trial court subsequently vacated
the writ and found the attorneys to be in contempt of court. 58 The
Illinois Supreme Court rejected the contemnors' argument that they
believed in good faith that they were not required to disclose the information to the trial court, explaining that:
An attorney's zeal to serve his client should never be carried to
the extent of causing him to seek to accomplish his purpose by
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1023 (1978).
47. 364 N.E.2d 50 (I11.
48. Id. at 54. The court reversed Hogan's jail sentence, but affirmed a $750 fine
against him. Id.
49. Id. at 51, 54.
50. Id. at 52.
51. Id.
1968)); see also People
52. Id. (citing People v. Johnson, 192 N.E.2d 864, 866 (I11.
1963).
v. Coolidge, 187 N.E.2d 694, 696 (I11.
53. Hogan, 364 N.E.2d at 52-53.
1957)).
54. Id. at 53 (citing People v. Goss, 141 N.E.2d 385, 387-88 (I11.
55. 147 N.E. 47 (11.1925).
56. Id. at 52.
57. Id. at 50.
58. Id.
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a disregard of the authority of the court or by seeking to secure
from a court an order or judgment without a full and frank
disclosure
of all matters and facts which the court ought to
59
know.
Lastly, in People v. Miller,6' the Illinois Supreme Court reversed a
direct contempt conviction of defense attorney William Cain.6 The
trial court convicted Cain of contempt after he had made "[g]ratuitous
comments which had a tendency to reflect upon the entire proceedings
of this [Circuit] Court., 62 In reversing the trial court, the Illinois Supreme Court cautioned that because a court's power of direct contempt
is an extraordinary one, the record must clearly demonstrate the conduct upon which the contempt conviction is based.63 The supreme
court found that, although Cain may have been overzealous, or improperly sarcastic at times, his conduct constituted a good faith attempt
to represent his clients without hindering the court's functions or
dignity, thus warranting a reversal of his contempt conviction.'
Although the Illinois Supreme Court has declined to specifically
label contempt of court a crime,65 criminal contempt must nevertheless
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.66 An alleged contemnor has
four defenses available to overcome a contempt charge. First, the
inability of an attorney to obey a trial court's order, through no fault of
the attorney's own, will excuse a charge of contempt.67 Second, a
contempt charge against an attorney who mistakenly or unintentionally
files a document with the court will not stand. 68 Third, an attorney
may overcome a contempt finding if a trial court fails to confer the due
respect and consideration to which the attorney is entitled as an officer

59. Id. at 52.
60. 281 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1972).
61. Id. at 294.
62. Id. at 293 (quoting the trial court's contempt order). The Illinois Supreme Court
failed to state the substance of Cain's "[g]ratuitous comments." Id.
63. Id. The court stated: 'The power to punish for direct contempt is an extraordinary
one, and the court must set forth fully and specifically in its order, or the record must
clearly show, the conduct upon which the finding of contempt is based." Id. (citing
People v. Tomashevsky, 273 N.E.2d 398, 401 (Ill. 1971); People ex rel. Andrews v.
Hassakis, 129 N.E.2d 9, 10-11 (Ill. 1955); People v. Loughran, 118 N.E.2d 310, 313
(I11. 1954)).
64. Miller, 281 N.E.2d at 294.
65. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
66. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Barasch, 173 N.E.2d 417, 420 (Ill. 1961).
67. See County of Cook v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 319 N.E.2d 472, 476 (III.
1974); JANET L. BASSETT, ILLINOIS INST. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., ATTORNEY
CONDUCT (1985).

68. See People v. Howarth, 114 N.E.2d 785, 790-91 (Ill. 1953).
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of the court. 69 Lastly, a finding of contempt will not stand if it is
shown that the attorney acted in good faith to serve his or her client's
interests."0 The good faith defense, however, does not allow an attorney to deceive the court.7 '
Punishment for criminal contempt may be by fine, imprisonment, or
both.72 After a court orders contempt punishment, it may also refer the
matter to the appropriate disciplinary committee for further review.73
Due process concerns, however, limit the severity of sentences where
74
there has been no notice, hearing, or other procedural guarantees.
Furthermore, a trial court's contempt order must be in writing,75
written contemporaneously with its oral order, and based upon the
court's recollections as to what occurred earlier.76 An appellate court's
standard of review for a direct criminal contempt finding is whether
there is adequate evidence to support the finding of contempt, and
whether the trial court considered any facts outside of the court's personal knowledge. 7
2. Professional Responsibility and Court Discipline
The Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (the "Illinois Rules")
guide attorney conduct in Illinois. 78 The Illinois Rules, which became
effective on August 1, 1990, 79 replaced the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility (the "Illinois Code"). 0 The Illinois Supreme
Court modeled the Illinois Rules after the 1983 American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the "ABA Rules").8 ' Although the ABA Rules included comments, the Illinois Supreme Court

69. People v. Rongetti, 176 N.E. 292, 297 (I11. 1931).
70. People v. Siegel, 445 N.E.2d 762, 764 (111. 1983).
71. People v. Sleezer, 139 N.E.2d 259, 262 (Ill. 1957).
72. People v. Harrison, 86 N.E.2d 208, 212 (I1l. 1949).
73. See WOLFRAM, supra note 2, § 12.1.3, at 626.
74. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 25, § 1.7(e), at 66 (citing Cheff v.
Schnakenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966)); supra note 41 and accompanying text.
75. People v. Jashunsky, 282 N.E.2d 1, 4 (IL1.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972).
76. People v. Wilcox, 125 N.E.2d 453, 456 (I11.1955).
77. People v. Graves, 384 N.E.2d 1311, 1314 (Ill. 1979).
78. ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1989).
79. Id.
80. ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A (repealed
1990).
81. See Timothy L. Donaho, Jr. & Maureen A. Lesicko, Survey of Illinois LawProfessional Responsibility, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1055, 1056 (1991); Ronald D. Rotunda,
The New Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct: A Brief Introduction and Comment, 78
ILL. B.J. 386, 386 (1990).
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enacted no formal comments when it adopted the Illinois Rules. 2
Nevertheless, the Preamble to the Illinois Rules provides some
instruction when considering the interaction of professional responsibilities and contemptuous conduct.8 3 The Preamble states that a
"[v]iolation of these rules is grounds for discipline." 4 It then advises
that confidence is an integral part of an attorney-client relationship, 5
and that maintaining confidence requires the attorney to "competently
and zealously" pursue the client's concerns within the bounds of the
law. 6 The Preamble cautions, however, that "zealously" does not
indicate "mindlessly[,] or unfairly[,] or oppressively.""
Several Illinois Rules delineate the parameters of an attorney's conduct before a tribunal. Among other rules, an attorney may not make
statements or participate in the creation of evidence which the attorney
knows is false. 8 The Illinois Rules also forbid an attorney from engaging in conduct which involves misrepresentation or which is
prejudicial to the administration of justice.8 An attorney is obligated
to keep the confidences of his or her clients, 90 although an attorney has
a duty to disclose "that which the lawyer is required by law to
reveal." 9 ' Furthermore, the Illinois Rules forbid ex parte communications with the trial judge. 92
In the spirit of the Preamble, the Illinois Rules guide Illinois courts
in disciplining attorneys, just as the Illinois Code had done previously. 93 Under the Illinois Code, a violation did not necessarily
constitute contempt of court. 94 Although there has not yet been a
82. See Rotunda, supra note 81, at 386.
83. ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl.

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. Rules 3.3(a)(1), 3.3(a)(5).
89. Id. Rules 8.4(a)(4), 8.4(a)(5).
90. Id. Rule 1.6(a); see also Appellant's Opening Brief at 16, Simac 1I, 641 N.E.2d
416 (No. 74843) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief].
91. ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(0(3). The Illinois Rules also
allow attorneys to withhold the identity of their clients only if "such information is
privileged or irrelevant." Id. Rule 3.3(a)(8); see Appellant's Brief, supra note 90, at 17.
92. ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.5(i); see Appellant's Brief, supra
note 90, at 18.
93. In re Kutner, 399 N.E.2d 963, 965 (Ill. 1979); In re Taylor, 363 N.E.2d 845, 847
(Ill. 1977) (stating that although the Illinois Code is not binding on courts, it does
"constitute a safe guide for professional conduct and an attorney may be disciplined for
not observing [the Code]").
94. People v. Wolf, 514 N.E.2d 1218, 1220 (II!. App. 3d Dist. 1987), cert. denied,
520 N.E.2d 392 (I11.
1988).
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reported case with the same holding under the Illinois Rules, one may
presume that such a decision would be similar. Even though an
Illinois Rules violation probably does not constitute contempt, several
disciplinary rules overlap with a court's contempt power to punish
conduct that hinders, embarrasses, or obstructs a court in the administration of justice.9 5
B. In-Court Identificationsand Zealous Advocacy
Illinois courts permit in-court identifications of defendants,96 despite
charges that the practice is inherently suggestive,97 as long as they are
based on personal knowledge and observation, and the defendant is
present in the courtroom. 98 The United States Supreme Court has
outlined a totality of circumstances test to be utilized in evaluating suggestive identification procedures.9
Factors that Illinois courts consider in assessing the reliability of incourt identifications include: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the
accused at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention;
(3) the accuracy of the witness' prior description; (4) the witness' level
of certainty at the confrontation; and (5) the period of time between the
encounter and the trial.' ° Under Illinois law, however, in-court identifications are admissible even if the witness is not positive or certain
of the identification,' I ' whether or not there has been a prior proper
identification, ° and whether or not there has been a prior failed iden95. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
96. See People v. Finch, 266 N.E.2d 97, 100 (Il. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 836
(1971).
97.

See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JERALD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 7.4(g),

at 372 (1992); THOMAS R.

LEEDHAM, LEEDHAM'S NOTES ON THE DEFENSE OF PERSONAL

MISIDENTIFICATION 196-205

(1984); ELIZABETH

F. LoFrus & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS

TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 6.19, at 158-59 (1992).
98. See People v. Smith, 576 N.E.2d 186, 190 (Ill. App. 1st Dist.), appeal denied,
580 N.E.2d 130 (Ill. 1991); 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 809 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
99. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
100. Id.; People v. London, 628 N.E.2d 621, 625 (11. App. 1st Dist. 1993), appeal
denied, 631 N.E.2d 714 (Ill. 1994); Smith, 576 N.E.2d at 190. In Smith, the court held
that the in-court identification of the defendant was properly admitted into evidence
because the victim had a clear opportunity to view the defendant during a sexual assault
and had reason to scrutinize the offender's face with care and attention. Id. at 190-91.
101. People v. Kubat, 447 N.E.2d 247, 263 (Ill.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983).
In Kubat, a witness was asked whether she saw anybody in the courtroom "who looks
like" the man she had previously observed in her bar. Id. The witness identified the
defendant. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court held that "[t]he fact that she did not make a
positive identification did not render her testimony inadmissible." Id.
102. People v. Grady, 438 N.E.2d 608, 612 (111. App. 1st Dist. 1982). In Grady, the
defendant claimed that an improper lineup had tainted the subsequent in-court
identifications. Id. at 611. The Illinois Supreme Court asserted that even if the lineup
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tification.' 3
A defense attorney may attempt to counter the suggestiveness of an
in-court identification in several ways, but allowing or disallowing any
defense tactic falls within the trial court's discretion."° Among other
tactics, the attorney may request an in-court lineup. 0 5 Although a
defense attorney may move for a courtroom lineup, there is no guarantee that a court will grant the motion because the Illinois Supreme
Court has held that a criminal defendant does not necessarily have a
right to an in-court lineup.' °6 Furthermore, a defense attorney may
attempt to seat the defendant at the defense table with a similar looking
person.' 0 7 The Illinois Supreme Court, however, has never held that a
defendant has a right to such a tactic. 0 8 The attorney may also try to
seat the defendant in the courtroom gallery, with no person taking his
place at the defense table."° Illinois courts, however, have previously
0
upheld trial court decisions denying such defense counsel requests."
was improperly suggestive, the identifications were nonetheless reliable. Id. at 612.
The court noted that the witnesses had a good opportunity to view the defendant during
the commission of the crime, each witness described an assailant similar to the
defendant and "only four hours elapsed between the shooting and the identifications."
Id.
103. People v. Flint, 490 N.E.2d 1025, 1029 (I11.App. 2d Dist. 1986). In Flint, a
witness failed to identify a photograph of the defendant on the same day of the robbery
and murder. Id. at 1027-28. The witness subsequently identified the defendant as the
perpetrator in a lineup and in court. Id. at 1028. The Illinois Supreme Court held that
the lineup and in-court identification were admissible, reasoning that "'[t]he photograph
may not have accurately portrayed [the] defendant. Moreover, an identification
ordinarily is based upon animate observation of a defendant in his entirety, rather than
an inanimate portrayal of his face."' Id. at 1029 (quoting People v. Woods, 252 N.E.2d
717, 720 (I11.App. 1st Dist. 1969)).
104. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 230 & n.5 (1977). In Moore, a rape victim
identified the defendant as the perpetrator at a preliminary hearing, during which the
defendant was not represented by counsel. Id. at 223. The Supreme Court reversed the
subsequent conviction, reasoning that had an attorney been present, the suggestiveness
of the in-court identification could have been avoided. Id. at 230-32. Possibilities
suggested by the Court included an in-court lineup, excusing the defendant from the
courtroom, and placing the defendant with the courtroom audience. Id. at 230 n.5.
105. See People v. Clark, 288 N.E.2d 363, 370 (I11. 1972); Finch, 266 N.E.2d at
100.
106. Clark, 288 N.E.2d at 370 (holding that the trial court was not obliged to conduct
an in-court lineup using several men with similar characteristics as the defendant);
Finch, 266 N.E.2d at 100.
107. See, e.g., Duke v. State, 298 N.E.2d 453 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973) (stating that
seating others with a defendant at the defense table is a valid means to challenge the
State's identification).
108. There are no reported Illinois Supreme Court cases holding that the defense has a
right to seat the defendant at the defense table with a similar looking person.
109. See People v. Gregory, 357 N.E.2d 1251, 1254-55 (III. App. 1st Dist. 1976).
110. See Gregory, 357 N.E.2d at 1255 (rejecting the argument that the trial court
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C. The Contempt Power,Attorney Advocacy, and
In-CourtIdentifications
A trial court's use of the contempt power and an attorney's zealous
advocacy have collided previously on the issue of in-court identifications. The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Thoreen,"' upheld a
criminal contempt conviction against a defense attorney who switched
his client with another individual at the defense table without the
court's permission." 2 In Thoreen, the defense attorney had repre' 3
sented a defendant who was on trial for illegal salmon fishing.
Without the court's permission, the defense attorney placed the defendant, dressed in a business suit, in the courtroom gallery, and placed4
another man, dressed in outdoor-type clothing, at the defense table."
During the trial, the defense attorney gestured to the manat the defense
table as if he were the defendant, and also failed to correct the trial
court after it erroneously identified the man at the defense table as the
defendant for the record." 5 Following the close of the prosecution's
case-in-chief, the defense attorney called the impostor as a witness and
disclosed the misidentification.1 6 The prosecutor subsequently reopened his case and the defendant was ultimately convicted." 17 Upon
discovering the attorney's switch, the trial court cited the defense
attorney with criminal contempt.'8
The Ninth Circuit upheld the criminal contempt conviction, reasoning that defense attorney Thoreen crossed the line between zealous
advocacy and actual obstruction." 9 The Thoreen court stated that the
attorney's behavior hindered the court's search for the truth, caused
delays, and breached a court custom and rule. 20 The Ninth Circuit
mistakenly denied the defendant's request to be allowed to sit somewhere in the
courtroom other than at the defense table).
I 11. 653 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982).
112. Id. at 1342-43.
113. Id.at 1336.
114. Id.The defendant "wore a business suit, large round glasses, and sat behind the
rail in a row normally reserved for the press." Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1336-37.
117. Id. at 1337.
118. Id. The trial court found the attorney in criminal contempt because the attorney
conducted the switch without the court's permission or knowledge, because
identification was not an issue, because the behavior disrupted and deceived the court,
and because the behavior violated a court custom. Id. at 1338. The trial court also noted
that attorney Thoreen's conduct conflicted with several provisions of the Washington
Code of Professional Responsibility. Id.
119. Id. at 1338-39.
120. Id. at 1339.
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also upheld the trial court's finding that the defense attorney's behavior
conflicted with several provisions of the Washington Code of
Professional Responsibility.' The court advised that identification of
the defendant was not at issue, thus refuting the need to attack the
credibility of the in-court identification." Finally, the court stated that
the defense attorney possessed the requisite intent for a contempt
exconviction because "he should have been aware that his conduct
3
ceeded reasonable limits and hindered the search for truth."'
Similarly, in Miskovsky v. State ex rel. Jones, 24 the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals upheld a direct criminal contempt conviction against an attorney who seated another person at the defense
table in place of the defendant without the court's permission. 2 5 In
Miskovsky, the defense attorney substituted another woman for the
26
female defendant at the defense table during a preliminary hearing.
A witness then misidentified the woman at the defense table as the
defendant and the court subsequently dismissed the case. 1 7 The trial
court then held defense attorney Miskovsky in direct contempt of court
and fined him $500. 128
The appellate court upheld the contempt finding, reasoning that the
attorney "knowingly implement[ed] a plan of deception" affecting the
court, the witnesses, and the prosecutor. 29 That court found that
attorney Miskovsky's conduct undermined the trial court's integrity
and authority. 3 ° The appellate court relied on the Oklahoma Code of
Professional Responsibility as a guide in determining that the attorney' s conduct constituted misrepresentation.' 3 '

121. Id. at 1341.
122. Id. at 1342.
123. Id.
124. 586 P.2d 1104 (Okla.Crim. App. 1978).
125. Id. at 1110.
126. Id. at 1106.
127. Id.at 1106 & n.1.
128. Id. Five attorneys testified at the contempt hearing, all stating that they were
unaware of any rule preventing an attorney from substituting a replacement for the
defendant at the defense table; most considering this to be a valid trial tactic. Id.
129. Id. at 1108.
130. Id
131. Id.
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III. DISCUSSION
A. The Factsand the Lower Courts' Opinions
During a traffic offense trial in Illinois, a DuPage County court
found criminal defense attorney David Sotomayor to be in direct
criminal contempt of court.'32 Sotomayor represented Christopher
Simac, who the State had charged with failing to yield while making a
left turn and with driving with a revoked license.'33 The State's only
H. LaMorte, a police officer for the City of Wood
witness was Ronald
34
Dale, Illinois.
Prior to Simac's trial, Sotomayor seated a clerk from his office,
35
David P. Armanentos, next to him at the defense attorney's table.
Sotomayor seated Simac in the back row of the courtroom. 136 Six
people, not including the courtroom personnel and the attorneys, were
seated in the courtroom. 37 Two of these six people were police
officers sitting in the jury box, and three of the remaining four people
(including Armanentos and Simac) matched Simac's general appearance. 38 The defendant and Armanentos bore similar physical
characteristics: 39 both men were tall, thin, dark blond-haired, and
wore glasses. 140 On the day of the trial, Armanentos was dressed
casually in jeans and a white shirt with blue stripes. 14' The defendant,
Simac, was
also dressed casually, wearing a white shirt with red
42
stripes.
Attorney Sotomayor substituted Armanentos for the defendant without the court's knowledge or permission. 4 3 Sotomayor also failed to
inform the prosecutor of the substitution. 44 At the beginning of the
trial, when the court instructed all testifying witnesses to come forward, Sotomayor advised the court that the defendant would not
132. Simac 1I, 641 N.E.2d at 417.
133. Id.
134. People v. Simac, 603 N.E.2d 97, 98 (I1l. App. 2d Dist. 1992), aff'd, 641 N.E.2d
416 (II1. 1994) [hereinafter Simac 1]. The complaining witness, Beth Nelson, did not
appear at trial. Simac II, 641 N.E.2d at 418.
135. Simac 1, 603 N.E.2d at 100.
136. Id.
137. Id.; Appellant's Brief, supra note 90, at 4.
138. Simac 1, 603 N.E.2d at 100; Appellant's Brief, supra note 90, at 4.
139. Simac II, 641 N.E.2d at 418.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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testify.
During the trial, Officer LaMorte testified about the traffic accident
allegedly involving Simac. 46 During his testimony, Officer LaMorte
identified Armanentos as the driver of the car involved in the accident. 47 The court then noted the identification of Armanentos as the
defendant for the record. 48 Still, Sotomayor did not notify the court
of the misidentification, nor did he disclose
that'the actual defendant,
149
courtroom.
the
in
elsewhere
sat
Simac,
Officer LaMorte further testified that during his investigation of the
accident, he asked the defendant for identification. 5 The police
officer believed, however, that Simac was unable to produce a driver's
license.' 5 ' Officer LaMorte also informed the court that he subsequently arrested the defendant for driving52on a revoked license and
for failure to yield while making a left turn.
Sotomayor then cross-examined Officer LaMorte. 53 The police
officer admitted that he had never seen the defendant driving and that
he did not witness the accident. 54 Sotomayor then moved to exclude
the witnesses, a motion which the trial court granted. 55 After Officer
LaMorte subsequently left the courtroom, 56 Sotomayor then called as
a witness Armanentos, the person whom Officer LaMorte previously58
57 After being sworn,
identified as the driver he had arrested.
Armanentos testified that he was not the driver of the car involved in
the crash on March 20, 1990.'59
145. Id. The clerk of the court asked Sotomayor, "Is your defendant [going to be
sworn]?" Id. (alteration in original). Sotomayor replied, "No." Id.
146. Id. The police officer arrived at the scene after the accident. Simac 1, 603
N.E.2d at 98. Upon questioning by Officer LaMorte, the driver of one of the cars
"admitted that he had attempted to make a left-hand turn and proceed westbound on Irving
Park Road and he was struck by a Chevrolet Nova." Id.
147. Simac 1I, 641 N.E.2d at 418.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Simac 1, 603 N.E.2d at 98. LaMorte also "testified regarding the certified
driving abstract of defendant which was admitted into evidence." Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Simac H, 641 N.E.2d at 418.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. Armanentos had to be sworn at this time because "he did not come forward to
be sworn when the court called for witnesses at the beginning of the trial." Id.
159. Id.
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The prosecutor then cross-examined Armanentos.1 6 Armanentos
stated that he did not know defendant Simac and advised the court that
16 1
he worked as a clerical employee in Sotomayor's law office.
Armanentos explained that it was his understanding that Sotomayor
had instructed him to sit at the defense counsel table in order to deter62
mine if the police officer would identify him as defendant Simac.'
Armanentos further
stated that he had been told that defendant Simac
163
looked like him.
Armanentos asserted that he did not know anything about the car
accident on March 20, 1990.'64 He then identified Simac, who was
still sitting in the back row of the courtroom, as the man with whom he
65
had seen defense attorney Sotomayor speaking before the trial.
Armanentos conceded that he resembled Simac. 166 Armanentos also
admitted, in response to the court's inquiry, that he did not approach
the clerk to be sworn as a witness before the trial began.' 67
Attorney Sotomayor next requested a directed finding in favor of
defendant Simac. 68 In support of his motion, Sotomayor argued that
Officer LaMorte misidentified the defendant and that, as required,
Simac was in open court. 169 Prior to the court ruling on the motion,
the prosecutor called Officer LaMorte back to the stand to allow him
another opportunity to identify the defendant. 170 The prosecutor asked
Officer LaMorte to "take a good look around the courtroom right
now." 7' The police
officer again misidentified Armanentos as the
72
defendant Simac.
160. Id.
161.

Id.

162. Id.
163. Id. Armanentos stated that he and Simac were both tall, thin, and Caucasian. Id.
164. Simac I, 603 N.E.2d at 99.
165. Id.
166. Simac 11, 641 N.E.2d at 418.
167. Id. Following Armanentos' testimony, the court allowed Sotomayor to state for
the record that Armanentos never approached the bench, that he was seated where he was
instructed and, therefore, was not sworn when the witnesses were called. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. Thus, Sotomayor argued that there was no fraud perpetrated upon the court.
Id.
170. Id. Prior to Officer LaMorte's testimony, the prosecutor called the defendant
Simac to testify. Id. Simac subsequently invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege and
was excused. Id. The court then rejected the prosecutor's attempt to call attorney
Sotomayor as a witness. Id. Next, the prosecutor asked that defendant Simac take his
position next to his attorney at the defense table. Id. The trial court replied: "[H]e can
sit any place he wants to in the courtroom. He is here." Id. (alteration in original).
171. Simac 1, 603 N.E.2d at 99.
172. Simac 11, 641 N.E.2d at 418.
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Because of Officer LaMorte's misidentifications, the trial court
7
granted Sotomayor's motion for a directed finding of not guilty.1 1
The trial judge also found Sotomayor in direct criminal contempt of
court, 74 explaining that the contempt finding was appropriate because
of Sotomayor's misleading conduct toward the court, the State's Attorney, and Officer LaMorte in placing Armanentos at the defense table
without notifying the court. 75 As punishment, the trial court imposed
a $500 fine.'
The following day, after the trial court made supplemental findings
involving the direct criminal contempt finding, 7 7 Sotomayor moved

173. Id.
174. Id. at 418-19.
175. See id. at 419. The trial court advised that Sotomayor's placing of Armanentos
at the defense table was "purposely done" to "mislead the Court." Simac 1, 603 N.E.2d at
99. The trial court further stated that Sotomayor was held in direct criminal contempt of
court "for having a person bearing the likeness" of the defendant Simac "sit at the
counsel table with him in the location usually occupied by the [defendant]." Id.
176. Simac 1I, 641 N.E.2d at 419.
177. The trial court stated:
"The court finds that it was the totality of the conduct of [defense] attorney
in court in connection with this case that is the basis for the court['s] finding
of criminal contempt for misrepresentation by inference including the
following findings:
1. That a person with the likeness of the defendant, a young, white male,
was the only person with defense attorney at the counsel table when defense
attorney came to the bench and said, 'Here is my jury waiver.'
2. That person was dressed in jeans and a shirt with no tie that is not the
courtroom attire of an attorney or co-counsel, yet that person sat in the
customary location of a defendant throughout the State's case.
3. That person was asked by the clerk to be sworn with other witnesses at
the start of the trial, to which defense attorney said that said person was not
going to testify. The obvious inference of this comment to the court and clerk
was that the person was the defendant because witnesses were excluded except
for defendant.
4. That person was identified as the defendant by the State witness police
officer, and all of the foregoing resulted in the court's comment that the record
could show that the defendant was identified for the record; there was no
defense attorney response to this court's comment that advised of the court's
impression and finding based on all that had occurred and that the court was
misled as to the identity of the defendant.
5. That person's only apparent purpose in the courtroom, in a defendant's
customary location with defense attorney, was to create an inference to the
court that he was the defendant, and this was done with the knowledge of
defense attorney.
6. That while there was no express misrepresentation by words, there was a
misrepresentation by inference by the totality of the conduct of the defense
attorney, and that was the basis of the criminal contempt of court finding."
Id. (alteration in original).
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for reconsideration his conviction. 78 The trial court denied the
motion, and Sotomayor appealed his
conviction to the Appellate Court
79
of the Second District of Illinois.
With one justice dissenting, the Second District Appellate Court
affirmed the trial court's finding of direct criminal contempt against
Sotomayor 8° The appellate court reasoned that the substitution "was
calculated to mislead the State and the court" because Sotomayor conducted the experiment without the trial court's permission or
knowledge.' 8' The court also found that Sotomayor violated several
provisions of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct. 8 2 Specifically, the appellate court found that Sotomayor engaged in conduct
which was prejudicial to the administration of justice,'83 and that he
misrepresented material facts and evidence to the tribunal.', 4 Although
the court recognized that a violation of the Illinois Rules does not
necessarily constitute criminal contempt of court, it found that Sotomayor surpassed
"the outermost limits of acceptable conduct before a
' 85
tribunal."'
The appellate court, however, reduced the $500 fine to $100.186
The dissenting opinion stated that Sotomayor's "action here was one
taken in the interest of his client, in good faith, and with respect for the
court." 187 The Illinois Supreme Court subsequently88 granted Sotomayor's leave to appeal the appellate court's decision.

178. Id.
179. Simac 1, 603 N.E.2d at 100.
180. Id. at 104.
181. Id. at 103.
182. Id. at 102-03. The appellate court found that the attorney had violated Rules
3.3(a)(1), 3.3(a)(5), 8.4(a)(4) and 8.4(a)(5) of the Illinois Rules of Professional
Conduct. Id.
183. Id. The appellate court found that Sotomayor violated Rules 8.4(a)(4) and
8.4(a)(5) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct by "engaging in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentations, [and] engaging in conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice." Id.
184. Id. at 103. The court held that attorney Sotomayor violated Rules 3.3(a)(1) and
3.3(a)(5) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct by misrepresenting "material
facts or law to a tribunal or participating in the creation or preservation of evidence
when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know the evidence is false." Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 104. The court stated: "In view of the fact that this is the first case in
Illinois that deals with the conduct described herein, it is our opinion that the fine of
$500 imposed by the circuit court should be reduced to $100." Id. The court modified the
fine under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b). Id.
187. Id. at 105 (Geiger, J., dissenting).
188. Simac II, 641 N.E.2d at 417.
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B. The Illinois Supreme Court's Opinion
Simac was a case of first impression for the Illinois Supreme
Court.' 89 In a four-to-three decision, the court upheld the appellate
court's direct criminal contempt conviction of trial attorney David
Sotomayor.' 9° Specifically, the court held that a contempt conviction
is appropriate when a defense attorney substitutes another person for
the defendant at the defense counsel table without the trial court's
permission or knowledge. 9'
The supreme court affirmed the Second District Appellate
Court's
$100.192
to
fine
Sotomayor's
of
reduction
the
judgment, including
The court's opinion, written by Chief Justice Bilandic, 193 focused on
Sotomayor's argument that he lacked the requisite intent for a criminal
contempt conviction.94 The court dismissed Sotomayor's argument
that his intent was to test the State's identification testimony by reasoning that the state of mind of an alleged contemnor need not be
proven affirmatively. 95 The court explained that intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the actor's behavior and
from the character of the actor's conduct. 96 Consequently, the court
ruled that Sotomayor's conduct revealed that his intent was not simply
to test the State's identification testimony. 197 Instead, the supreme
court found that Sotomayor intended to cause a misidentification,
thereby deceiving not only the State and its witness, but also the court
itself. 98 The most telling fact for the court, concerning Sotomayor's
intent to deceive, was Sotomayor's failure to correct the trial judge's
erroneous statement for the record that Officer LaMorte had identified
defendant Simac.

99

Rather than accepting Sotomayor's claim that he simply intended in
good faith to test the veracity of the State's identification,200 the court
reasoned that Sotomayor had at least three alternative methods avail189. See Simac 1, 603 N.E.2d at 101.
190. Simac H, 641 N.E.2d at 424, 427.
191. See id. at 424.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 417. After reciting the facts of the case, the court began by tracing the law
of the contempt power in Illinois courts. Id. at 420.
194. Id. at 420-22.
195. Id. at 421.
196. Id. Specifically, the court advised that "[t]he intent may be inferred from the
surrounding circumstances and the character of the party's conduct." Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 422.
200. Id.
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able to test the State's identification testimony: (1) conduct an in-court
lineup; (2) seat the defendant in the courtroom gallery without placing
a substitute at the defense table; and (3) place more than one person at
the defense table.2 ' 1 The court concluded that because Sotomayor had
these options available, he could have realized his objective as an advocate without misleading the State, the witness, and the trial court. 2
Next, the supreme court rejected Sotomayor's argument that
requiring a defense attorney to give the court notice and secure its
permission prior to placing a replacement at the defense table would
violate principles of professional responsibility.0 3 Sotomayor maintained that in a bench trial such as Simac's, prior disclosure to the trial
judge of his concern regarding the validity of the identification testimony would sway the trial court's ability to render a just opinion.2'
Sotomayor further contended that prior disclosure of his trial
strategy to the judge would have necessarily required disclosure to the
prosecutor due to the ban on ex parte communications, and that such
disclosure would have violated Sotomayor's ethical obligations to his
client. 20 5 Additionally, Sotomayor argued that revealing his strategy
would have created an ethical dilemma for the State's Attorney, who,
according to Sotomayor, would have been forced to decide whether to
inform the identification witness what to expect, or to seek a just result
by remaining silent.2'
Without referring to the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, the
court rejected Sotomayor's professional responsibility arguments.2 7
The supreme court stated that a trial judge in a bench trial is presumed
to consider only competent evidence in making a finding.2 For an
appellant to overcome this presumption, the supreme court noted, the
record must establish that the trial court's judgment relies on a private
analysis of the evidence or other private information about the facts in
201. Id.
202. Id. By using these alternative methods, Sotomayor could possibly have shown
that Officer LaMorte could not identify the defendant as the driver of the car. If LaMorte
would have been unable to identify the defendant using these other means, a finding
would probably have been directed in favor of the defendant.
203. Id.
204. Id. Sotomayor argued that "in a bench trial such as this where the court also
functions as the trier of fact, prior disclosure to the court of his concern regarding an
identification issue would somehow influence the court's ability to render a just verdict
based solely on evidence presented during the proceedings." Id.
205. Id.; see Appellant's Brief, supra note 90, at 18.
206. Simac II, 641 N.E.2d at 422; see Appellant's Brief, supra note 90, at 18.
207. Simac I, 641 N.E.2d at 422-23.
208. Id. at 422 (citing People v. Tye, 565 N.E.2d 931, 943 (Ill. 1990)).
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the case.2 °9
The Simac court also rebuffed Sotomayor's contention that prior
disclosure would violate his ethical obligations, explaining that trial
courts and prosecutors are frequently made aware of defense strategies
and concerns when arguing motions in limine.2'0 Furthermore, the
court observed that a prosecutor is not placed in an ethical dilemma
with such prior disclosures by defense counsel. 21 ' The court analogized the situation where a prosecutor is made aware of the defense
attorney's plan to place a substitute at the defense table to situations
where a court has granted a defense's motion in limine and the
prosecution is aware of evidence which it cannot use at trial.212 After
the granting of such motions in limine, the court stated, the prosecution has been able to continue without violating its ethical
duties.21 3
Lastly, the court noted that its decision was supported by two cases
decided outside of Illinois: United States v. Thoreen214 and Miskovsky v. State ex rel. Jones. 2 5' The supreme court explained that both of
these cases involved fact patterns similar to Simac.216 The court explained that the Ninth Circuit in Thoreen upheld the finding of
contempt because the defense attorney's subversive tactics impeded the
court's ability to ascertain the truth.217 The court also noted that the
Ninth Circuit found that the defense attorney violated the state's code
of professional responsibility, and that the substitution crossed over
the line from zealous advocacy to obstruction because it delayed the
proceedings. 1 8

209. Id. at 422-23 (citing Tye, 565 N.E.2d at 943). The court advised that "[i]n order
to overcome this presumption, the record must affirmatively demonstrate that the court's
finding rests on a private investigation of the evidence or other private knowledge about
the facts in the case." Id. (citing Tye, 565 N.E.2d at 943).
210. Id. at 423. The court advised that such motions occur on a daily basis and those
attorneys "who utilize this pretrial procedure do not violate their ethical obligations to
their clients." Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. (citing United States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982)); see supra notes 111-23 and accompanying text.
215. Simac 1I, 641 N.E.2d at 423-24 (citing Miskovsky v. State ex rel. Jones, 586
P.2d 1104 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978)); see supra notes 124-31 and accompanying text.
216. Simac II, 641 N.E.2d at 423-24 (citing Thoreen, 653 F.2d at 1336-37;
Miskovsky, 586 P.2d at 1106); see supra part II.C.
217. Simac 1I, 641 N.E.2d at 423 (citing Thoreen, 653 F.2d at 1341-42).
218. Id. (citing Thoreen, 653 F.2d at 1339-40).
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Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that in Miskovsky, the
Oklahoma appellate court found that the substitution of the defendant
for another individual at the defense table, without the court's knowledge or permission, constituted contumacious conduct.2 9 The Simac
court also noted that the Oklahoma appellate court found that the
defense attorney violated Oklahoma's Code of Professional Responsibility .220
C. The Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Nickels 221 asserted that defense
attorney Sotomayor acted in good faith to protect defendant Simac
from a suggestive in-court identification.222 He argued that Sotomayor's conduct was not calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct
the court; instead Sotomayor was requiring the State to prove its
case. 223 Justice Nickels relied on People v. Miller 24 to demonstrate
that a good faith representation of one's client will not constitute
contemptuous conduct.2z
Justice Nickels' dissenting opinion further argued that the surrounding circumstances demonstrated a good faith reason to challenge
the State's identification.226 Justice Nickels explained that it was
reasonable to challenge the State's identification because the State had
delayed the trial, the case rested on the testimony of Officer LaMorte,
and the State had no complaining witness. 7 Additionally, he argued
that at no time during the trial did Sotomayor show disrespect for the
court's authority or attempt to hinder the proceedings.228 These fac219. Id. at 423-24 (citing Miskovsky, 586 P.2d at 1109).
220. Id. at 424 (citing Miskovsky, 586 P.2d at 1108). Interestingly, the Simac court
discussed the finding that the Oklahoma attorney had violated the Oklahoma Code of
Professional Responsibility, while not referring to the Illinois Rules of Professional
Conduct in its own opinion. Id.; see supra note 207 and accompanying text.
221. Justices Harrison and McMorrow joined in the dissent. Id. at 427 (Nickels, J.,
dissenting).
222. Id. at 424 (Nickels, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 425 (Nickels, J., dissenting). Justice Nickels also argued that there is no
"duty imposed upon a defense attorney to assist an eyewitness or the State by providing
a suggestive identification setting." Id. (Nickels, J., dissenting).
224. 281 N.E.2d 292 (I11.1972); see supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
225. Simac I1, 641 N.E.2d at 425 (Nickels, J., dissenting).
226. Id. (Nickels, J., dissenting). Justice Nickels asserted: "Given the unreliability
of an identification based only upon the placement of defendant at counsel's table,
defense counsel acted in good faith and on behalf of his client." Id. (Nickels, J.,
dissenting).
227. Id. (Nickels, J., dissenting).
228. Id. (Nickels, J., dissenting).
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tors, he stated, did not evidence a contumacious design.229
Justice Nickels then went on to distinguish Thoreen,23 0 arguing that
the attorney in Thoreen showed an intent to mislead the court because
he actually disguised the man sitting at the defense table to resemble a
person who had been arrested for illegal fishing."' Justice Nickels
also observed that the defense attorney in Thoreen gestured to the
impostor at the defense table and consulted with him during the proceedings.232 Furthermore, Justice Nickels stated that, unlike Simac,
identification was not an issue in Thoreen.233
Lastly, Justice Nickels' conceded that there were a variety of better
methods to protect a defendant from a suggestive in-court identification.234 He explained, however, that the issue is not whether the
attorney made the best choice, "but whether his specific conduct
showed disregard for the court's authority and the administration of
justice. 235 On this question, Justice Nickels concluded that Sotomayor's conduct was a good faith attempt to test the accuracy of the
State's identification.236

IV.

ANALYSIS

In Simac, the Illinois Supreme Court appropriately upheld defense
attorney David Sotomayor's direct criminal contempt conviction. The
court, however, neglected to thoroughly confront several important
issues that its decision may create.
The Simac court correctly held that a direct criminal contempt
finding is appropriate when a criminal defense attorney switches the
defendant with another individual at the defense table, without the
court's permission or knowledge.237 Specifically, the court properly
found that Sotomayor possessed the requisite intent, 23 8 as clearly indicated by the surrounding circumstances and the character of his
229.

Id. (Nickels, J.,dissenting).

230.

Id. at 426 (Nickels, J., dissenting) (citing Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332); see supra

notes 111-23, 214-18, and accompanying text.
231. Simac II, 641 N.E.2d at 425 (Nickels, J.,dissenting) (citing Thoreen, 653 F.2d

at 1336).
232. Id. (Nickels, J.,
dissenting) (citing Thoreen, 653 F.2d at 1336).
233. Id. (Nickels, J.,
dissenting) (citing Thoreen, 653 F.2d at 1338).
234.

Id. at 427 (Nickels, J.,dissenting).

235.

Id. (Nickels, J., dissenting).

236. Id. (Nickels, J., dissenting). Justice Nickels argued that "[c]ounsel did not
misrepresent the identity of defendant in any way and attempted in good faith to test the

veracity of the State's case." Id. (Nickels, J.,dissenting).
237.

See id. at 424.

238. See id. at 421.
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action.239 In fact, because Sotomayor undoubtedly knew that the trial
court would assume that the man sitting next to him was the defendant,
the substitution was clearly an act of deception. As the Illinois
Supreme Court indicated, the "true identity of the defendant is clearly a
fact 'which the court ought to know. ' ' 240 Defense attorney Sotomayor
crossed the line between advocacy and contemptuous conduct even
further when he did not correct the trial court when it noted the misidentification for the record. 24' From these facts, the court correctly
inferred that Sotomayor intended to deceive the court, 242 thereby warranting a criminal contempt conviction.
While upholding the contempt finding was appropriate, the court
opinion still failed to fully address three issues that its decision may
create: first, whether the alternative tests the court set forth for testing
243
in-court identifications were realistic alternatives for attorneys;
second, whether requiring an attorney to inform the prosecution of a
plan to test an identification creates an ethical dilemma for the prosecutor; 24 and last, whether this decision should take into account the
Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct.245
A. In-CourtIdentifications: Are Options Really Available?
The first issue that the majority opinion failed to fully address was
the issue Sotomayor was attempting to expose through his substitution
plan: courtroom identifications are inherently suggestive.246 Commentators have argued that in-court identifications are even more

239. See supra notes 42-46, 194-99, and accompanying text.
240. Simac 11, 641 N.E.2d at 422 (quoting People ex rel. Fahey v. Burr, 147 N.E. 47,
52 (I11.
1925)); see supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
241. See Simac H1, 641 N.E.2d at 422; see supra notes 143-49 and accompanying
text.
242. See Simac 11, 641 N.E.2d at 422; supra notes 42-64 and accompanying text.
243. See infra part W.A.
244. See infra part IV.B.
245. See infra part IV.C.
246. See generally LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 97, § 7.4(e), at 372 (stating that incourt identifications are even more suggestive than one-on-one confrontations at the
police station); Cindy J. O'Hagan, When Seeing is Not Believing: The Case for
Eyewitness Expert Testimony, 81 GEO. L.J. 741 (1993) (discussing the weaknesses of
eyewitness identifications and suggesting that courts should allow eyewitness expert
testimony); Wallace W. Sherwood, The Erosion of ConstitutionalSafeguards in the Area
of Eyewitness Identification, 30 How. L.J. 731 (1987) (examining various
identification procedures and arguing that recent Supreme Court cases have eviscerated a
defendant's due process protections); Lawrence E. Taylor, Reliability of Eyewitness
Identification, 15/3 TRIAL LAW. Q. 10 (1983) (criticizing eyewitness identifications as
unreliable).
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suggestive than police show-ups."' While the United States Supreme
Court has restricted police show-ups to special circumstances, the
Court allows prosecutors to utilize in-court identifications in many
situations.24 Despite the suggestiveness of in-court identifications,
the Illinois Supreme Court has recognized the importance of the procedure.249
In Simac, the supreme court suggested that Sotomayor had options
other than placing an impostor at the defense table to test the State's
identification testimony.250 These options included conducting an incourt lineup, seating the defendant in the gallery without someone
taking his place at the defense table, and seating the defendant at the
defense table with another non-attorney, next to the defendant.25 The
viability of these options, however, were questionable given the facts
of the case. Before a trial court will allow a defense attorney to utilize
one of these alternatives, it must first find that. identification is an issue
and then determine whether there exists a reasonable likelihood of a
mistaken identification. z2 In Simac, however, there
was no indication
53
prior to trial that identification would be an issue.2
First, the witness making the identification was a police officer. 54
Although courts do not presume that police officers are more likely to
tell the truth than other witnesses,255 in the case of a traffic dispute, a
court will view the officer's testimony as more credible than most
witnesses, based on an assumption that2police
officers pay greater
6
attention to details than casual observers. Second, Officer LaMorte
247. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 97, § 7.4(g), at 372. A police show-up is
essentially a one-man lineup; the police will present a single person to a witness
shortly after the crime has been committed to determine if the suspect is the perpetrator
of the crime. Id. § 7.4(f), at 372.
248. See id.
249. Simac 1, 603 N.E.2d at 104 (Geiger, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Morgan,
568 N.E.2d 755, 772-73 (I11. 1991)). The appellate court stated that in Morgan, the
Illinois Supreme Court "found no error in the trial court's decision not to hold a hearing
on suppression of an in-court identification because the identification's reliability was
supported by an unchallenged, independent basis." Id. (Geiger, J., dissenting) (citing
Morgan, 568 N.E.2d at 773).
250. Simac HI, 641 N.E.2d at 422.
251. Id.; see supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
252. See People v. Clark, 288 N.E.2d 363, 370 (Ill. 1972) (explaining the necessity
of there being an issue surrounding the identification before allowing the techniques
listed above to test the identification). See generally LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 97,
§ 7.4(c), at 370 (discussing the risk of misidentification).
253. Simac II, 641 N.E.2d at 417-18.
254. Id. at 417.
255. Crook v. Crook, 70 N.E.2d 209, 213 (111. App. 1st Dist. 1946).
256. See generally Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 115 (1976) (explaining that
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observed defendant Simac at the scene of the accident while conducting the interview, which presumably lasted several minutes.257
Thus, a trial court would give substantial weight to the officer's
testimony because the officer, a trained observer, had several minutes
to observe and pay attention to the defendant. Third, Officer LaMorte
demonstrated no apparent hesitation in identifying the law clerk,
Armanentos, as the defendant in court," 8 thereby indicating reliability."

9

Finally, although the accident had occurred nine months

before the trial, 6 Illinois courts have upheld identifications made over
two years after the occurrence.26'
Because it is unlikely that the trial court would have found identification to be an issue, the court most likely would have disallowed any
defense request to challenge the identification testimony, including the
tactic that Sotomayor actually used. Thus, the Simac court inappropriately concluded that Sotomayor's action was not a good faith
attempt to test the State's identification because other options were
available.262 In reality, there was only a slight chance that the trial
court would have allowed Sotomayor to employ the types of identification challenges mentioned by the Simac court.
Alternatively, even if the trial court had found that identification was
at issue, an in-court lineup, although seemingly the best solution, is
not always available.263 Specifically, the Illinois Supreme Court has
held that a trial court need not grant a defendant's request to stage an
in-court lineup. 2 4 Similarly, although a defense request to sit the
a police officer may be a more credible witness because he is more likely to pay a higher
degree of attention due to the fact he has the job of looking for criminal activity).
257. Simac I1, 641 N.E.2d at 418.
258. Id.
259. See Manson, 432 U.S. at 114 (stating that the certainty of the identification at
the time of the confrontation is one of several factors to be considered).
260. Simac I1, 641 N.E.2d at 417.
261. See People v. Rodgers, 290 N.E.2d 251, 254-55 (I11. 1972) (upholding a
conviction based on eyewitness identification that was three years old); People v. Dean,
509 N.E.2d 618, 622-23 (I11.App. 1st Dist. 1987) (upholding a conviction based on
eyewitness identification which was two-and-one-half years old), overruled on other
grounds by People v. Jackson, 599 N.E.2d 926 (Ill. 1992).
262. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
264. People v. Clark, 288 N.E.2d 363, 370 (I11. 1972). In Clark, the defendant,
Clark, was the only African-American man at the counsel table when he was identified as
the offender. Id. Clark argued on appeal that the trial court should have held an in-court
lineup, using other similar-looking African-American men. Id. The Illinois Supreme
Court relied on a Washington Supreme Court case in rejecting Clark's argument:
'Defendant's racial attributes were a mere identifying characteristic. We can
envision white defendants who could well be the only one [sic] in the room
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defendant in the courtroom gallery without a substitute at the defense
table would sufficiently test the State's identification, prior Illinois decisions have upheld trial court rulings denying requests by defendants
to sit in the courtroom gallery without anybody taking their place at the
defense table.2 65 Lastly, the Illinois Supreme Court suggested that
Sotomayor could have moved the trial court for permission to seat a
similar-looking person next to the defendant at the defense table. 66
Although this also would have tested the State's identification witness,
there is no reported Illinois case holding that a defendant has a right to
such a tactic; thus, trial courts are presumably free to deny such requests.
Although the trial court most likely would have rejected Sotomayor's request to challenge Officer LaMorte's identification of the
2 67
defendant, Sotomayor should not have taken the action he did.
Instead, he could have attacked the credibility of Officer LaMorte on
cross-examination if Officer LaMorte correctly identified the defendant.168 Sotomayor could have questioned the witness on various
issues, including: the length of the interview; the lighting conditions
during the interview; the length of time since the accident; how many
other accidents the police officer had investigated since the one at
issue; what else was going on when the police officer was interviewing the defendant; any inconsistent descriptions; the age of the
police officer; and how long he had been on duty the day of the
incident.2 69 Officer LaMorte's answers to some of these questions
might have weakened the impact of the in-court identification.
Moreover, if Sotomayor's cross-examination of Officer LaMorte
was unsuccessful, and the court subsequently convicted Simac, Sotowith red hair, a crew cut, or a beard. The prosecution is not required to pack a
courtroom with blacks or people who resemble a defendant, in order to insure a
proper identification.'
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Brown, 458 P.2d 165, 166 (Wash. 1969)).
265. E.g., People v. Gregory, 357 N.E.2d 1251, 1255 (I11.App. Ist Dist. 1976). In
Gregory, the trial court rejected the criminal defendant's pretrial motion requesting that
he be allowed to sit somewhere other than at the defense counsel table during the in-court
identification. Id. The appellate court upheld the ruling, stating that the witness "had an
excellent opportunity to view [the defendant] during the entire duration of the crime."
Id.
266. Simac 1I, 641 N.E.2d at 422.
267. See supra notes 135-45 and accompanying text.
268. See LEEDHAM, supra note 97, at 204; LOFTus & DOYLE, supra note 97, § 10.01.26, at 251-304.
269. See Manson, 432 U.S. at 114-16; People v. London, 628 N.E.2d 621, 625 (Ill.
App. 1st Dist. 1993); see also LEEDHAM, supra note 97, at 204; LoFrUs & DOYLE, supra
note 97, § 10.01-.26, at 251-304; supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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mayor could still have appealed the conviction. The basis for the
appeal would have been the trial court's rejection of other available
methods, such as an in-court lineup, to combat the suggestiveness of
the in-court identification. 270 Although an appeal in a traffic court case
is unlikely, if a client is willing to contest the conviction based on the
in-court identification, then the matter should be brought up with the
appellate court.
B. The Prosecutor'sEthical Dilemma
Although the Simac court determined that Sotomayor should have
informed the court and the State of his desire to test the in-court identification, it did not thoroughly confront the ethical dilemma the
prosecutor may have faced if he were aware of the information. As
Sotomayor argued, the State's Attorney would have to decide whether
to inform the police officer of what to expect, or to seek a just result by
refraining from influencing the identification witness' testimony. 27'
In short, the issue is how far the prosecutor could have gone in
preparing the identification witness without violating any ethical obligations. The prosecutor most likely would have violated legal ethics
had he told the witness about Sotomayor's switch because he would
be tainting Officer LaMorte's testimony. 2 It is not clear, however,
whether it would have been unethical for the prosecutor to advise the
witness to "be careful," or to "take your time" with the courtroom
identification. 273 The Simac court failed to delineate what the prosecutor could have told the witness, had he known of the substitution
plan, and still stay within ethical limits.
Even if the prosecutor had been too suggestive in questioning the
police officer, the trial court would have most likely allowed the identification to stand. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that where an
identification procedure is unduly suggestive, the identification will

270. See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
271. Simac IH,641 N.E.2d'at 422-23; see Appellant's Brief, supra note 90, at 18.
272. See generally JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, JR,, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 10.01.32, at 470-522 (1985) (discussing various instances of prosecutorial misconduct and
violations of the American Bar Association's standards).
273. See Simac 1, 603 N.E.2d at 99. In Simac, the prosecutor tried a similar tactic.
Prior to the police officer's second attempted identification of the defendant, the
prosecutor advised the witness to "take a good look around the courtroom right now."
Id. The trial court sustained Sotomayor's objection to the prosecutor's phrasing of the
question. Appellant's Brief, supra note 90, at 5. Nevertheless, the police officer still
mistakenly identified the clerical worker, Armanentos, as the defendant. Simac 1, 603
N.E.2d at 99.
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nevertheless be admitted if it is independently reliable.274 In other
words, if there is enough independent evidence that a witness' identification of a defendant was reliable, then the identification will be
admitted. 275 Factors which would indicate that Officer LaMorte's
identification of Simac was independently reliable include the length of
the interview with Simac, Officer LaMorte being more than a casual
observer, and Officer LaMorte's lack of hesitation when identifying
Armanentos as the defendant. 276 Because Officer LaMorte had interviewed Simac for some time, because he was more than a mere casual
observer, and because he made his identification without hesitation,
the trial court probably would have found Officer LaMorte's identification reliable, notwithstanding unduly suggestive questioning by the
prosecutor.
Again, however, the Illinois Supreme Court correctly rejected Sotomayor's argument that the prosecutor's ethical dilemma excused
Sotomayor's behavior. The defense attorney should first advise the
court and the prosecutor of the concerns regarding the in-court identification.277 Then, if the defense attorney believes the prosecutor
tainted the identification, the defense attorney should object, thereby
preserving the issue for appeal. If the witness' identification testimony
could not be shaken on cross-examination, then an appeal based on the
tainted identification may become necessary.
C. Rules of ProfessionalConduct: Violated?
Despite the correctness of the court's narrow holding in Simac, the
Illinois Supreme Court also failed to address the relevance of the
Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct in drawing the line between
attorney advocacy and court discipline. Although the Second District
Appellate Court found that Sotomayor had violated two of the Illinois
Rules, the Illinois Supreme Court did not even comment on this
aspect of the lower court's opinion. Furthermore, the court did not
274. See People v. Williams, 515 N.E.2d 1230, 1233 (Ill. 1987). For factors that
courts consider in assessing the reliability of in-court identifications see supra note 100
and accompany text; Manson, 432 U.S. at 114; supra notes 96-98, 100-03, and
accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 254-61 and accompanying text.
277. See Simac 11, 641 N.E.2d at 422 (stating that the defense attorney could have
requested, prior to the in-court identification, other methods to test the witness'
identification of the defendant).
278. Simac 1, 603 N.E.2d at 102-03 (finding that Sotomayor violated Rules
3.3(a)(1), 3.3(a)(5), 8.4(a)(4), and 8.4(a)(5) of the Illinois Rules of Professional
Conduct); see supra part III.A.
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employ the Illinois Rules when addressing Sotomayor's specific
argument that the ethics of professional responsibility compelled him
to act in the way he did. 79 Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court's
decision suggests that, although Sotomayor's conduct was contemptuous, he did not violate the Illinois Rules and did not deserve
disciplinary action by the bar.
Had the court employed the Illinois Rules in evaluating Sotomayor's
conduct, it would have concluded that Sotomayor violated at least two
of the Rules: Rule 3.3 - Conduct Before a Tribunal, and Rule 8.4 Misconduct. 280 Sotomayor substituted his law clerk for the defendant
without the court's knowledge or permission.28' Sotomayor must
have realized, or at least should have known, that this substitution
would create the false impression for the judge that the man sitting next
to the attorney was the defendant. 282 Rule 3.3(a) requires an attorney
to act with candor before the court and avoid misrepresentation.283
Thus, because Sotomayor knew, or should have known that his
behavior created a false impression, he violated this rule.2"
Similarly, Rule 8.4 forbids an attorney from engaging in conduct
which involves misrepresentation or is prejudicial to the administration
of justice. 285 Therefore, by misrepresenting to the trial court that the
man sitting next to him was the defendant, Sotomayor also violated
this rule.286 Furthermore, Sotomayor misrepresented to the court that
Simac was sitting beside him when he did not correct the trial court's
279. Simac H, 641 N.E.2d at 422-23; see supra part III.B.
280. ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.3(a)(1), 3.3(a)(5), 8.4(a)(4),
8.4(a)(5) (1989). Illinois Rules 3.3(a)(1) and 3.3(a)(5) advise that:
(a) In appearing in a professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall
not:
(1) make a statement of material fact or law to a tribunal which the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know is false; [or]
(5) participate in the creation or preservation of evidence when the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know the evidence is false.
Id. Rule 3.3(a)(1), (5).
Furthermore, Illinois Rule 8.4(a)(4), (5) states that "[a] lawyer shall not: (4) engage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; [or] (5) engage in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." Id. Rule 8.4(a)(4), (5).
281. Simac 11, 641 N.E.2d at 418.
282. The Illinois Supreme Court advised that Sotomayor "was aware that the only
inference the court could draw . . . was that the person sitting next to appellant at
counsel's table was the defendant." Id. at 421.
283. ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a).
284. See id. Rule 3.3(a)(1), (5).
285. Id. Rule 8.4(a)(1), (5).
286. See id.
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notation
of the defendant for the record, thus further violating the
287
rule.
Conversely, Sotomayor incorrectly argued that he would have
violated principles of professional responsibility had he obtained the
court's permission before carrying out his plan. 288 The Illinois Rules
allow an attorney to zealously represent a client only if such representation is within the bounds of the law. 289 Thus, Sotomayor was
not entitled to deceive the court in order to further his zealous
representation of his client. 2'
V. IMPACT

Because the issue is rarely litigated, Simac will influence future
attorney behavior throughout the country. 29' Prior to this decision, the
practice of substituting another person for the defendant at the defense
table without the court's knowledge may have been a tacitly accepted
practice in some areas.292 Now, however, trial judges and attorneys
know that such an act could result in a criminal contempt conviction
for the attorney. Illinois attorneys should now know that to challenge
these practices, they had better have the court's permission. To proceed without such permission, attorneys risk a contempt of court
conviction or other disciplinary measures.293 Furthermore, Simac's
impact most likely will not be limited to Illinois attorneys. Just as the
Illinois Supreme Court looked to other jurisdictions for guidance in
Simac, 294 other courts may depend on Simac in deciding this rarely
287. Simac H1,641 N.E.2d at 418.
288. Sotomayor argued that prior disclosure to the trial judge would have to include
the prosecutor because of the ban on ex parte communications. Id. at 422. Such
communications with the prosecutor, Sotomayor argued, would reveal the defense
attorney's strategy, thus violating his professional responsibility. Id.; see ILLINOIS
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a), (b); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101, DR 7-110 (1981). See supra notes 203-06 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Sotomayor's complete argument.
289. Simac 1, 603 N.E.2d at 103; ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Canon 7, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I IOA (repealed 1990).
290. See Simac 1, 603 N.E.2d at 103 (citing People v. Buckley, 517 N.E.2d 1114,
1118 (I11.App. 2d Dist. 1987)).
291. See Patrick A. Tuite, Courtroom Experiments Can Be Hazardous to Your
Pocketbook, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Jan. 20, 1993, at 6. Tuite cautioned that the contempt
finding against defense attorney Sotomayor is an example of attorneys who suffer
financially from attempting courtroom experiments. Id.
292. See generally Miskovsky v. State ex rel. Jones, 586 P.2d 1104, 1106 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1978) (advising that five attorneys testified at a contempt hearing stating
that the tactic utilized by the defense attorney was a valid trial tactic).
293. See supra parts III.B and IV.C.
294. See supra notes 214-20 and accompanying text.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 26

litigated issue. 5
On the other hand, Simac demonstrates the suggestiveness of incourt identifications.2 6 Officer LaMorte twice misidentified Armanentos as the defendant Simac. 297 These misidentifications illustrate the
highly suggestive nature of in-court identifications. 298 Thus, an attorney still may be willing to risk discipline from the court, and possible
professional discipline, to challenge an in-court identification. If an incourt identification results in a misidentification, the court may drop
the charges against the client.
Although Simac will widely impact attorney conduct, the court
could have strengthened its effect on Illinois attorneys by examining
the Illinois Rules for guidance in evaluating Sotomayor's conduct.
Because Illinois enacted the Illinois Rules less than five years ago,2 99
the supreme court has had little opportunity to interpret them. Although the court's affirmation of the criminal contempt conviction
demonstrates to Illinois attorneys one specific type of conduct that is
contemptuous, contempt convictions are still within the discretion of a
particular trial court."
The Illinois Rules, on the other hand, guide all Illinois attorneys'
behavior.3"' Therefore, a discussion by the court applying the Illinois
Rules to Sotomayor's conduct, and answering whether he was subject
to professional discipline, would have greatly benefited Illinois attorneys. Had the court found that attorney Sotomayor had violated the
Illinois Rules, thus supporting the contempt conviction, Sotomayor
could also have been exposed to professional discipline. 3 1 Sanctions
for violation of the Illinois Rules vary from a private informal admonition to disbarment.30 3 Illinois attorneys, observing that the
Illinois Supreme Court upheld Sotomayor's contempt of court conviction without referring to the Illinois Rules, 3° may be willing to
295. The author was able to find only two reported cases, other than Simac,
involving this precise issue: United States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982) and Miskovsky v. State ex rel. Jones, 586 P.2d 1104
(Okla. Crim. App. 1978). See supra notes 111-31 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 246-49 and accompanying text.
297. Simac H, 641 N.E.2d at 418.
298. See supra note 97.
299.

ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr (1989).

300. See supra part II.A.1; see also WOLFRAM, supra note 2, § 12.1.3, at 625.
301. See In re Taylor, 363 N.E.2d 845, 847 (Ill. 1977).
302. ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl. (advising that a "[v]iolation of
these rules is grounds for discipline").
303. See WOLFRAM, supra note 2, § 3.5.1, at 118.
304. Simac I1, 641 N.E.2d at 424.
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attribute the contempt conviction to a hard-line trial judge. With a
finding that Sotomayor had violated the Illinois Rules, however,
attorneys would have realized that professional disciplinary action is
still possible, even without a contempt conviction. 0 5 Therefore, a
discussion of the Illinois Rules by the Illinois Supreme Court, rather
than merely a discussion of the law of contempt, would have had a
more sobering effect on Illinois attorneys.
Simac answers many questions but yet leaves several unanswered.
Certainly, attorneys in Illinois now have a better idea of the Illinois
Supreme Court's view of courtroom chicanery. Considering that the
case was only a four-to-three decision, however, the court's position
could easily change in the future.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Simac, the Illinois Supreme Court properly affirmed defense
attorney David Sotomayor's direct criminal contempt conviction.3 °6
With this decision, the court sent a message: before a defense attorney
attempts to employ a device that is out of the ordinary courtroom
procedures, the attorney had better obtain the court's permission.
Nevertheless, Sotomayor, through his courtroom experiment, sent a
message of his own: in-court identifications are inherently unreliable. 0 7 Thus, as long as defense attorneys receive permission
before conducting the experiment, trial courts in the future should be
more receptive to ideas put forth by attorneys to test in-court
identifications.
JAMES A. FRANCQUE

305. See ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl. (explaining that a
violation of the Illinois Rules is grounds for discipline, thus a contempt finding is not
necessary).
306. SeesuprapartIV.
307. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.

